The emergence of China as an economic powerhouse provides both challenges and opportunities to the Southeast Asian developing economies, the ASEAN countries. The paper analyzes the trade pattern and investment relationship between the two areas and tries to shed a light on the above issues. It is found that competition did exist between the two areas in world export markets for manufacturing goods and in attraction for foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the expansion of Chinese economy provides a brightly promising export market for ASEAN countries. The dramatic increase of exports of ASEAN to China in the past decade might indicate a very different picture of the so said "missing middle" in economic globalization time, i.e., there could be a newly appearing niche for middle income countries in the "chain" of world export market. The paper also discusses policy responses of ASEAN countries toward the impact of the newly emerged Chinese influence.
I. Introduction
The emergence of China as an economic powerhouse provides both challenges and opportunities to its neighboring developing countries. ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) economies are in the immediate region of the rising Chinese influence. One of the concerns is that ASEAN's traditional exports market in the world may be taken away by China if China turns into the world low cost manufacturing workshop. Another challenge facing ASEAN is the outflow of foreign direct investment to China. Meanwhile, trade between China and ASEAN increased dramatically during the past decade, grown at an annual average of 19 percent (Table 8) Facing the fast expansion of China's impact, how should the ASEAN economies respond to all the challenges and the opportunities? It is of great importance to have a thorough investigation of the issue. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the above issues from three aspects: (1) look at past trade pattern and the movement of FDI between China and ASEAN and find out the areas of possible competitions between China and ASEAN, and find out the possible impacts of the these competitions to ASEAN members, in particular, the impacts to specific industries in each individual country; (2) examine the emerging market opportunity of the expanding Chinese economy to ASEAN countries, and (3) analyze the responding polices of ASEAN countries and consequences of the policies.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief review of the recent development in ASEAN economies and the trend of the economic relationship between ASEAN and Chinese economies. Section three analyzes in detail of the evidences of the possible challenges and opportunities of the rising Chinese economy to ASEAN members.
Section four discusses the policy responses of ASEAN members to the rising Chinese economy and the possible consequences. Section five provides brief concluding remarks.
II. ASEAN Economies and Recently Appeared Problems
The ASEAN Economies. The outbreak of Asian financial crisis in 1997 was critical for ASEAN economies. Since then the development road became stumble and the future was getting unclear (See Table 1 ). Before the crisis, however, the ASEAN economies documented a long term high growth rate during the period of 1980s and early 1990s. Started from a very primary level of technology and with limited market size and resources, outward looking policies in trade and investment were the most feasible choices for ASEAN. Exports of labor intensive products and inflow of foreign direct investment eventually transformed ASEAN into the fast growing economy in the last two decades of the previous century.
The performances of the ASEAN economies are, however, diversified. Among them, Singapore singled out close to developed economy, Malaysia and Thailand are at a relatively high industrialization level, and Philippines and Indonesia are at the less developed level.
Major economic indicators of the ASEAN-5 in the last decade are listed in Table 2.   TABLE 1 Real GDP Growth Rate of ASEAN-5 and China 1987-2004 (in percentages) 
III. Challenges and Opportunities to ASEAN Facing Rising China
Accompanying the stumble road for ASEAN economies since late 1990s is the emerging Chinese economy. Though China's non-depreciation policy during the crisis helped the region out of the downturn trend eventually, but some also believe that the devaluation of Chinese Yuan in 1994 and then fast expanded China's exports in labor intensive products were one of the important factors to the crisis occurrence. And the consequently well developed Chinese economy brought an unpresedented shock not only to the region of Southeast Asia and but also to the rest of the world.
III.1 Competition in World Export Market
The success of China's economic reform generated tremendous economic power as a huge trade nation and magnetic field for international investment capital. Given the steady slow growth of world market demand for labor intensive goods in the past ten years, fast expansion of China's exports will inevitably take certain market shares away from traditional labor intensive products exporting countries. The ASEAN economies are the immediate affected ones, among them, Singapore is the most likely affected because a large proportion of China's exports production is relocated from Taiwan and Hong Kong, which produce the similar goods as Singapore does. Table 2 shows that since 1997 financial crisis, ASEAN's exports experienced drastic ups and downs while China's exports grew often at a high rate of more than 20 per cent.
More specifically, we may check the export competition between ASEAN-5 and China in US market. Table 3 provides the amounts of exports of ASEAN and China to US market. MS is the China's market share in the US for the same type of products.
The assumption is that the sign of parameter b should be negative if competition happened between ASEAN members and China for that particular type of products. If a positive sign appears for parameter b, the assumption of competition of China and ASEAN members should not hold in that product. Statistically, the method should also overcome the possible problems of heteroscedasticity when different products are pooled into one group. Another assumption is that the sum of the market shares of the two regions maintains a stable trend.
The data covers 1-digit and 2-digit SITC goods and the time periods are 1987 -1992 (Chew and Liu 1998 ) and 1987 -2000 (Liu and Luo 2004 . The results are presented in Table 5 .
In general, competition happened in primary good between ASEAN members of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and China, while the competition between Singapore and China is mostly in manufacturing sectors. It is also clear that in the period 1987 -1992 (Chew and Liu 1998 , no competition was seriously appearing except in the group of manufactured good of SITC 81-89. However, after extension to the period 1987-2000, the big category of basic manufactures (SITC 61-60) turned to be significantly negative and the bigger group of one digit regression (SITC 5-9) also turned to be significantly negative.
Overall, we can conclude that the export competition in US market between Singapore and China was getting severe starting from the early mid 1990s. The results are not surprising and are consistent with our common believe that Singapore has a relatively advanced production level among the four NIEs, but with time passes, China caught up very quickly in the basic and mid range of industrial products. It means that in the coming years, Singapore will face further pressure from China given China's fast learning ability.
The above estimation is however only covering the data up to year 2000. After year 2000, the competition in general is getting more severe to all of the ASEAN-5 members. 
III.2 Competition in Attracting FDI
No doubt, the diversion of FDI from Southeast Asia to China is an obvious fact. The main flow of FDI to Asia has changed the direction in recent years that more than 70 per cent of the FDI is now flowing into China instead to Southeast Asia as before. 
III.3 The Increasing Importance of China's Market to ASEAN
Parallel to the challenges of the rising Chinese economy that ASEAN must face is the opportunity appeared of China's large market. For the past decade, all of the ASEAN-5 experienced fast increase in trade with China. The annual average increasing rate is all more than 14 percent. (See Table 8 ). Table 2 ). The destination change of Singapore's exports for the past 10 years is shown in Table 9 , from which we can observe clearly that the quickest expanded market for Singapore Therefore the sign of parameter of both tariff and exchange rate should be negative. Another variable added to our model is the year variable. This variable helps to account for changes in trade value that is attributed to economic factors other than tariff and exchange rate.
Within the primary sector, there are 5 individual industries. Hence 4 dummy variables are introduced into the model. Dummy variables help to capture effects that are due to changes in any industries within the primary sector. Three dummy variables are also introduced to the manufacturing sector model for the same reason. The results are presented in Table 10 . Note: N is the number of observations; due to the conversion from Harmonized System to SITC code and the difference in general tariff rates, the number of observation is not following the pattern that within each year there are 5 observations (for sitc 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). Estimators are tariff's coefficients; numbers in the parentheses below the estimators are t-values.
The results show that Singapore and Malaysia are benefiting more from China's tariff cut in manufacturing goods, while Indonesia is benefiting more in primary goods. Singapore is benefiting substantially in all manufactures with a rate from US$153,080 to US$636,270
for each sitc two-digit item for one per cent tariff reduction in China, and the current average tariff of China is 11.3 per cent. By the end of 5 th year of China's WTO entry, the average tariff rate of China should fall to 9 per cent, while once the China-ASEAN FTA established in 2010, the tariff will be removed completely. The biggest effect is for the large item of crude materials, which is Singapore's refined oil exports. If the tariff eventually removed completely, the total stimulation to Singapore's exports will certainly a big impact.
IV. Policy Responses and Adjustment of ASEAN Countries
Facing the fast development of economic globalization and the challenges posed and opportunities provided by the rising Chinese economy, ASEAN countries had in fact actively managed their policies to copy with the changing world economic environment. Although some policy changes adopted in ASEAN nations are not necessarily due to the pressure of the rising Chinese economy, it is obvious that competition from China is one of the important factors. Accordingly, we examine the policy responses in two aspects, policies copying with competition and policies to make use of the opportunity.
IV.1 Policies Coping with the Competitions
During the past decade, ASEAN countries as a whole had initiated a positive approach towards the increasing world economic competition environment. On the regional scale, they adopts regional co-operation in forming the ASEAN free trade zone, and expand the free trade zone to include China (ASEAN plus one). At the national level, each of the countries separately signed free trade agreements with third parties, to secure its market access. To avert direct competition with China, they make extraneous effort by moving up the technological ladder so that they are always ahead of China. In no small effort, they also develop their niche areas to avoid head-on collusion with China. For those relatively large economies such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, they take a two-track approach. On the one hand, they continue with the export-oriented approach, albeit with some differences in view of the emergence of China. On the other hand, they look inward to their domestic market as a new source of economic stimulus for sustaining their economic growth.
As far back as in 1993, ASEAN countries took the initiative to set up the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA). The purpose was not so much a direct response to the rise of China but rather for the humble aim to integrate a market economy comprising of 500 million people in Southeast Asia. On this free trade platform, intra-ASEAN industrial linkages can be forged with the ultimate aim of developing the ASEAN region as a viable international production centre. Such a move is economically beneficial to all the countries. Firstly, industries in the region can enjoy massive economies of scale. Secondly, comparative advantage of each country can be exploited and intra-trade can be expanded. Finally, through industrial linkages, an integrated production and trade system will be developed such that the regional as a whole can withstand the onslaught of severe competition in the international market.
Apart from the AFTA, ASEAN countries extend their regional co-operation into investment areas. These include the formation of the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) scheme, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on
Services, e-ASEAN, and the ASEAN Integration of Preferences. These regional co-operation efforts were initiated, like the AFTA, not so much to avert the so-called threats from the rise of China (Zainal Aznam, 2003) , but rather the rise of China makes the need for these agreements more pressing as a self-help approach to sustain regional economic growth.
At the national level, it is natural that each ASEAN member country responded differently according to its own special condition.
Singapore. Restructuring economies, expanding potential export markets, and cutting business cost are the three major strategies used in Singapore to copy with the increasing world competition.
To resolve the hardship since 1997, Singapore had initiated a series of policy change which are not only responses to the challenges from China, but also overall strategies coping with the increasing competition from the accelerated globalization. Among all the competition that Singapore faces, disappearing of the country's traditional competitive advantage is the essential one. That is, the labor and land cost is reaching the level of developed economies while the production technology is not the same as in the developed economies. Once the multinational companies relocate their headquarters and production factories to China, the weakness of indigenous enterprises emerged. Upgrading the level of industries and to find and to create new advantages become the unavoidable choice, as Mr Goh Chok Tong, then Prime Minister of Singapore, indicated Singapore has to remake their economy.
For the long term strategy, Singapore is investing in research and development in new industries like biochemical industry and life sciences to create new comparative advantages, and reforming the education system to encourage innovative thinking and talents to fit the demand of knowledge economy. For the short term, business policies are changed to improve the investment environment by cutting corporation taxes and labor wages to keep Singapore as a regional base for company headquarters and factories. Efforts are also spent to expand international markets for Singapore's exports by forging new trade pacts and to enhance regional co-operations in investment and production to overcome the size constraint. In following we will review the policies that Singapore has adopted in detail.
Restructure industries to increase competitiveness. Singapore economy is characterized by strong state control and foreign investment. State and foreign entrepreneurship has been the driving force in the economy; the local private sector in comparison has been relatively weak, particularly in industry (relative to commerce and services). Large scale of government linked companies (GLCs) and many statutory boards monopolized major social resources in infrastructure, financial services, telecommunications, health services, education, port shipping services, housing, and so on, private sector has little space to develop. With the declining returns of GLCs investment, bold reforms have been carried out in privatizing many of the state controlled business.
Increase investment in new industries to foster comparative advantages. As a long term goal toward a knowledge-based economy, Singapore has been actively cultivating intellectual capital and advanced infrastructure to build strong industries with competitive levels of innovation and technology. To facilitate the new knowledge-based economy, the Government is making further improvements in infrastructure.
• Terminal 3 at Singapore's Changi Airport will be completed in the year 2004, which will increase the capacity of the airport to 60 million passengers a year.
• Singapore will be the 1st country in the world to be connected by a single broadband network. Singapore ONE's collaboration with US-based @Home Network will expand its services beyond the domestic market.
• The National Science and Technology Plan 2000 aims to spend more than S$4 billion over five years to strengthen indigenous technological capabilities to support private R&D work.
• The Singapore government is spending S$2 billion on information technology for education. In 2002, there was a ratio of one computer for every two students.
Accompanying the industrial upgrading strategy, measures to improve the quality of labor force has also been adopted. The international talent policy is changed to attract professional talents from international market with more flexible requirements. Reforms in education system have been carrying out to adapt better of a knowledge based-economy.
Cut business cost to remain Singapore competitive. In cutting business cost, Singapore government has done (1) reducing land rent, office rent, water and electricity prices; (2) cutting labor wages and changing wage structure to flexible wage scheme; and (3) cutting corporation tax to 20 per cent from 22 per cent. Incentives for domestic investment are provided such as the corporation tax cut. Incentives were also granted to companies to reduce the cost of doing business and to encourage exports.
Another strategy is to promote new sources of growth, particularly in the services sector.
Viewing the fact that service sector accounts for 55 percent of Malaysia's GDP, service industry promotion packages were to attract more operational headquarters, regional distribution centers, and representative offices to Malaysia. Efforts were also made to exploit opportunities for "exporting" certain services, particularly tourism, education and health. (See Zainal Aznam, 2004) .
With a very much similar exporting structure and higher labor cost than China, Malaysia has very limited choices in manufacturing sector except to upgrade the manufacturing level and move up the value-added chain by promoting the knowledge-based economy. The dual track policy of Thailand is that the first tract is the usual model which emphasizes export-oriented strategy in manufacturing spearheaded by multinational corporations (MNCs).
The second track is more domestic in focus. It provides strong support to local enterprises leveraging on indigenous skills and resources. In the short run, the government strategy is to stimulate domestic demand through its expenditure on rural and agricultural sector. In the meantime, the second track also seeks to develop new local industries as part of the diversification away from traditional model. In addition, the track also attempt to implement measures to assist business to move up the value added chain, thus keeping ahead of direct 
IV.1 Policies toward Complementarities
Contrary to the competition in the world exports markets and FDI attraction between ASEAN countries and China, the complementarities of the two areas are showing a great potential in trade and in investment. Market opportunities provided by growing Chinese economy to ASEAN countries are already revealed in Table 8 and Table 10 . The growing Chinese economy has become another engine of growth to ASEAN countries.
The most important policy mechanism to make a full use of the complementarities between ASEAN and China if the planned Free Trade Aera by 2010. In 2001, both parties agreed to sign the ASEAN-China FTA which covers commodity and service trade, as well as investment. Under the agreement, the free trade zone will be established among the developed ASEAN countries and China by year 2010, and extend to less developed ASEAN nations by year 2015. Such regional approach will provide a synergy among countries in this region to further boost and sustain economic development based on complementarities and economies of scale. ASEAN, being a region richly endowed with natural resources, will be able to meet the increasing demand for raw materials, especially oil and gases for its industrial production. At the same time, especially in the electronics and telecommunication sector, China will serve as assembly and export platform for ASEAN manufactured exports. Chantasasawat, Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2004) (Wong and Chan, 2003) .
Among the ASEAN countries, the largest recipient was Thailand, followed by Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar. At the same time, about 100 Chinese companies have been listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange.
In integrating their economies with the rising Chinese economy among the ASEAN members, Vietnam appeared to be a newly emerged regionally economic star, with a steadily high growth rate during the past decade, outperformed all ASEAN member countries (See Table 11 ). Started rather late in 1980s, Vietnam made some important policy reforms to integrate its economy to the world. These policy reforms include shifting from a centrally planned economy to a multi-sector market economy, creating favorable conditions for business activities to ensure domestic and foreign investment, creating a legal framework in administration for the market economy. These policies of "Doi Moi" (means renovation) have generated significant results in Vietnam's economic performance. Not much time in facing the competition from China, instead, Vietnam's economy grows more parallelly with the expansion of its trade with China. Table 12 shows that Vietnam experienced an average of 23.8 percent growth rate in exports to China during the last decade and even a higher average rate of 38.6 percent in imports (See Table 12 Source: ADB, statistics online, 2006.
V. Concluding Remarks
China may be seen as a threat to the ASEAN economy as indicated by some empirical evidences. There are also strong evidences to show that this threat can be turned into potential opportunities provided policy responses are conducive to such transition. While regional approach towards the rise of China may be considered as rational and positive, the effectiveness and success of such approach depends largely on strong political commitment and co-operation of each and every ASEAN member. National policy responses may vary from country to country. With such a new pattern of economic integration between the ASEAN and China, we should be confident to expect that the potential of the economic cooperation between the two areas are only at the beginning stage and future is bright.
